“Required reading” from the Texas Supreme Court includes its opinions on basic procedural issues as well as key commercial-law concepts.
Procedure: The standard for evaluating sufficiency of evidence
City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) (“‘No evidence’ points must, and may only, be sustained when the record discloses one of the following situations: (a) a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; (d) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of the vital fact.”).
Procedure: The standard for mandamus relief
In re: Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004) (“Prudential must meet two requirements. One is to show that the trial court clearly abused its discretion. . . . . The other requirement Prudential must meet is to show that it has no adequate remedy by appeal. . . . The operative word, ‘adequate,’ has no comprehensive definition; it is simply a proxy for the careful balance of jurisprudential considerations that determine when appellate courts will use original mandamus proceedings to review the actions of lower courts. These considerations implicate both public and private interests.”).
Procedure: Potential error in a broad-form submission
Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378 (Tex. 2000) (“[W]hen a jury bases a finding of liability on a single broad-form question that commingles invalid theories of liability with valid theories, the appellate court is often unable to determine the effect of this error. The best the court can do is determine that some evidence could have supported the jury’s conclusion on a legally valid theory. To hold this error harmless would allow a defendant to be held liable without a judicial determination that a factfinder actually found that the defendant should be held liable on proper, legal grounds.”
Substance: The role of “red flags” in evaluating justifiable reliance
JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Orca Assets GP, 546 S.W.3d 648 (Tex. 2018) (“Viewed in context with the numerous ‘red flags,’ Orca’s sophistication in the oil-and-gas industry, and the direct contradiction between the representation and the letter of intent, Orca cannot maintain its claim of justifiable reliance.”); cf. Credit Suisse AG v. Claymore Holdings LLC, No. 18-0403 (Tex. April 24, 2020) (“The fact that certain irregularities might have been gleaned from a close examination of the 200-page Appraisal and its supporting documentation does not eviscerate the jury’s finding that Credit Suisse had superior knowledge of the material facts. . . . [G]iven the jury finding of its superior knowledge, Credit Suisse cannot rely on the contractual disclaimers to defeat liability for fraudulent inducement.” No. 18-0403 (April 24, 2020) (citation omitted).
Substance: Sanctity of contract
Energy Transfer Partners LP v. Enterprise Products Partners LP, 593 S.W.3d 732 (Tex. 2020) (quoting Sir George Jessel as saying: “[I]f there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of justice. Therefore, you have this paramount public policy to consider—that you are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of contract.”).
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