An excellent recent article in Law360 summarizes the state of the sometimes-Byzantine structure of Texas’s intermediate appellate courts. The article is behind Law360’s paywall but my remarks are below:
About those intermediate courts –
Author Archives: dscoale
Hearing about rehearing
“[T]he State in its sovereign capacity, unlike ordinary litigants, is not subject to the defenses of limitations, laches, or estoppel.” E.g., State v. Durham, 860 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. 1993). The Supreme Court identified an exception to that general principle in Wallace v. Tex. Dept. of Fam. Prot. Servcs., No. 17-0428 (Oct. 25, 2019) (and two companion cases), holding: “We agree that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because Wallace did not seek rehearing of the order she challenges before the administrative law judge. But because, as in Mosley, the agency misrepresented the proper procedure for judicial review in a letter to Wallace, we hold that Wallace was denied due process.”
Fact dispute? No mandamus.
Taxation of land on the shoreline of Corpus Christi Bay (right) has presented a difficult jurisdictional dispute for years between the taxing authorities of Nueces and San Patricio Counties. In considering the most recent mandamus petition about the situation, the Supreme Court noted three, longstanding requirements for such a writ: “One is that the duty required to be performed by mandamus shall not be dependent upon the determination of any doubtful question of fact. Another limitation is that the writ of quo warranto or mandamus be a proper or necessary process for enforcement of the right asserted. A third is there must be some strong and special reason for the exercise of this extraordinary original jurisdiction by a court designed primarily as the court for the correction by appellate review of errors of inferior courts in determining questions of law.” The Court found that the parties’ disputes over the nature of [petitioner’s] facility in relation to the counties’ boundary are significant and require resolution,” and thus found that it had no jurisdiction based on the first of the above-quoted factors. In re Corpus Christi Liquefaction LLC, No. 19-0671 (Oct. 25, 2019).
Multiple grounds
The appellant in In re C.W. challenged two grounds for the termination of her parental rights; the court of appeals affirmed the judgment based on one of those grounds. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further consideration of the second ground, as it had independent significance as a “finding which can affect her parental rights to other children . . . .” No. 18-1034 (Oct. 18, 2019) (per curiam).
New Blog!
Welcome to the new sister blog to 600Camp and 600Commerce from the appellate practice of Lynn Pinker Cox & Hurst.
600Camp follows commercial litigation in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 600Commerce does the same for Texas’s Fifth District Court of Appeals in Dallas, and 600Hemphill will cover commercial litigation in the Texas Supreme Court. Why the name? Click on “About“!
